My opinion piece on Excessive
Tribunalisation in India, published today in Moneylife, is reproduced below:
EXCESSIVE TRIBUNALISATION: THE PITFALLS OF PARALLEL EXTRA-JUDICIAL SUPER-COURTS
Navdeep Singh
Emergency it was when the
concept of Tribunalisation was pushed into the national consciousness through
the 42nd Amendment. The idea was clear for the rulers of that day-
tacit executive control over judicial functioning through quasi-judicial bodies
piggybacking on the bogey that these shall relieve regular Courts of their
burden.
Notwithstanding the repeated
red-flagging by the SC, excessive Tribunalisation, with the eagerness of the
executive to give it impetus, slowly and surely threatens the judicial fabric
of our democracy with the creation of parallel extra-judicial Super-Courts
which are now dangerously hovering over the citizenry with a life of their own
without being effectively amenable to the regular judicial set-up of the Westminster
model, a fright we must no longer ignore.
The recent statement of the PM
over functioning of Tribunals vis-a-vis regular Courts rightly created a lot of
buzz and was reflective of the concerns of jurists, lawyers, litigants and bar
associations over the functioning of Tribunals, which, in their present form,
do not inspire confidence of stakeholders and end up as post-retirement sinecures
or a case of ‘dangling carrots’ rather than the noble aim of rendering justice
in the form of public service to the community.
To take a few examples, many
Tribunals function under those very ministries against whom they have to pass
orders. The Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
function under the Ministry of Finance, the Armed Forces Tribunal functions under
the Ministry of Defence while the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate
Tribunal functions under the Ministry of Communications & IT. These Ministries
not only control Tribunals with invisible strings but also with tangibles such as infrastructure, finance, salaries and staff along
with the rule-making power. Secretaries of the same Ministries (the opposite parties
in litigation) sit in the selection, reappointment and inquiry panels of
Adjudicating Members of the Tribunals. Continual directions by even
Constitution Benches of the SC to place the control of Tribunals under the
Ministry of Law & Justice have not yielded any positive change. Ministries refuse
to part with their fiefdoms, a situation diametrically opposite not only to our
Constitutional norm of separation of power but also against the concept of judicial
independence recorded in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. It therefore comes as no surprise that Courts in many
nations have resisted the encroachment of judicial functions by
executive-controlled bodies- in the US (Northern
Pipleline case, 1982), Canada (Residential
Tenancies Act case, 1981), Australia (Harry
Brandy case, 1995) and even in Pakistan (Riaz-ul-Haq case, 2012).
It should concern all of us that
while our fiercely independent Constitutional High Courts have steadfastly
protected the rights of citizens from official tyranny, the shape of Tribunalisation
is stealthily being moulded in a manner to blunt out the power of our HCs conferred
by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. For many Tribunals, illusory and
non-vested appeals are being provided directly to the SC by circumventing HCs to
ensure that the latter do not maintain a check on the functioning of such
Tribunals by keeping them within the confines of law. Even provisions of direct
appeals to the SC are designed in such a fashion that they are not maintainable
in most cases. Some Tribunals such as the Armed Forces Tribunal have become the
first and the last court for litigants and all-pervasive bodies neither amenable
to HCs nor to the SC and without a vested right of judicial review since a
direct appeal has been provided to the SC only in limited cases where there is
the exceptional involvement of a “point of law of general public importance”. Hence
contrary to what is projected, some Tribunals have left litigants remediless
and justice made so inaccessible and unaffordable that affected parties are
expected to rush to the highest Court of the land in Delhi even for petty and
routine matters. Both law-makers and law-interpreters need to ponder over such
deleterious consequences.
The PM’s cue should have ideally
generated a call for strengthening of our real Courts and reducing the length
and breadth of Tribunalisation except in highly technical matters involving
precise expertise. Reduction of burden on Courts cannot be at the cost of independence
of judicial functioning by creating an analogous quasi-judicial hierarchy
functioning under the executive.
So what can be the way out? In
order to restore public faith, the following steps appear worthy:
Though best avoided, if a pressing need is felt
then Tribunals may only be retained as replacement of the jurisdiction of
Courts of first instance in specialised subjects and fully amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of High Courts on lines of the Central Administrative Tribunal.
The correct function of Tribunals should remain
to supplement and filter out cases for the superior judiciary and not to replace
it. Other than highly technical matters, Tribunals can at best function as
fact-returning bodies of experts leaving adjudication of disputes to regular
Courts.
Tribunals may not be allowed to be seen as post-retirement
sinecures. An orientation capsule be introduced for non-Judicial members.
Tribunals should be placed under an independent
body or commission, and till that ideal objective is achieved, under the
Ministry of Law & Justice as an interim measure, on the lines of the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal, and may not be allowed to function under parent Ministries.
Bureaucrats of the said Ministries should never be made a part of selection
process for Members of Tribunals.
Members of Tribunals should be provided the best
possible facilities but not from the Ministries against which they have to pass
orders. Members should be given the security of tenure but without the system
of reappointment.
Since “reduction of burden” on Courts and “quicker
dispensation of justice” was ostensibly the aim of Tribunalisation, a stringent
provision for time-bound redressal must be incorporated in all statutes dealing
with Tribunals.
The striking down of the
National Tax Tribunal last year has raised hopes that any attempt to undermine
the independence of judicial functioning would not be allowed to prevail in our
democracy. While stakeholders hope that the PM’s sentiments get translated into
actual action, the system needs to wake up to the reality that a litigant has
more faith in independent adjudicating Courts with an expedient cost-effective
mechanism of judicial review with Constitutional Courts rather than being stuck
in a chaotic labyrinth functioning under the thumb of the opposite party reflecting
the worst kind of conflict of interest, a peril we must fervidly resist.
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