General VP Malik and I attempt to address issues related to the decision-making process in the defence establishment, in "The Tribune". The unabridged version is as below:
Defence Decision-Making Process:
Time for Change
Time for Change
General VP Malik
(Former Chief of the Army Staff)
Major Navdeep Singh
(Advocate, Punjab & Haryana High Court)
Decision-making process of the defence
establishment with its myriad complexities has always remained a vexed issue.
It has been a cause of alienation with people in uniform, court cases, delays
in acquisitions and procurements, lack of integration & jointness, and
several other aspects of national security.
This opinion piece does not break much new
ground but the aim is to emphasise the need for our political leaders to debate
and decide on this issue promptly, and to that end, this attempts to work as a
catalyst.
Under the Rules for Allocation and
Transaction of Business framed in 1961 the defence services have absolutely no
role or powers ascribed to them. The Defence Secretary is allocated
responsibilities for “Defence of India” and ancillary facets during war with the
“Armed Forces of the Union” and the three Services Headquarters subordinately designated
as “Attached Offices of the Department of Defence”.
The professional heads of the three services
charged with the command of the armed forces, and responsibility of national
defence as well as conduct of war, neither have been accorded a status nor
granted any powers in the edifice of the Government of India. By default, the
Defence Secretary is thus tasked with the “Defence of India”.
The obvious reason is that for many years
after independence, there was deep-rooted suspicion, fuelled by happenings in
the neighbourhood, as to whether the military in India would continue to remain
in barracks under the control of the cabinet or would take to adventurism. Although
the defence services have remained staunchly loyal to the Constitution and acquitted
themselves admirably in peace and conflict, certain vested interests have not
allowed obliteration of that suspicion. As a result, the military has been kept
in a box, not allowed to participate in the policy or decision-making loop.
Our political establishment, hence, despite
the vastly changed strategic environment, nature of conflicts, and the
imperative need to consult defence chiefs directly on such issues, has been deprived
of this facilitation. Some Defence Ministers like Jaswant Singh and Pranab
Mukherjee, and Prime Ministers like Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, met
the service chiefs more often than others. But the institutionalised system and
the defence decision-making process was never resolved.
Over a period of time, certain changes have
been incorporated. Limited financial powers have been delegated to the defence
services and the file movement system also minimally altered. But these changes
remain cosmetic. The spirit and substance of the integration of the Ministry of
Defence including decision-making have not been altered. The nomenclatures may
have changed from “Army Headquarters” to “Integrated Headquarters of Ministry
of Defence (Army)” but within the Ministry itself, the old terminology and
processes continue to be followed. Even today, despite the manifesto of the
ruling party calling for “ensuring greater participation of Armed Forces in the
decision-making process”, not much seems to have moved towards resolution.
While the inherent suspicion towards the
military waned with time, the pretext of ‘checks and balances’ gained momentum
for keeping the defence services out of actual decision-making. Needless to
state, the requirement of such checks and balances is entirely vital and no
single entity, the military included, can be provided a free run without
scrutiny or without being counter-questioned on its proposals. But the question
remains as to whether a counter-balance as at present, wherein decisions of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) are allowed to be commented upon in the form
of file noting initiated by junior non-specialist civilian employees should
continue, or whether a collegiate system be instituted at the apex level wherein
collective defence related recommendations or decisions can be taken subject to
the approval of the political executive.
The system currently followed, besides causing
suspicion and distrust, often results in delays and sometimes imbalanced
decisions. While this is not to say that the decisions of the military should be
allowed to prevail without question, we only suggest that the conclusions
should be based upon collective deliberations with collation of proper views of
all stakeholders on an equal footing before they are put up to the political
authority for sanction.
It is also a matter of concern that in some
spheres where powers have been delegated, the system is being rendered
infructuous with too much leeway being displayed by military authorities. To
take an easily understandable example, powers to determine disability benefits
of officers have been conferred upon military authorities and appellate
committees. However, even after processing such proposals in consonance with
the rules and after due affirmation by executive, legal and medical authorities,
the same are abandoned by the senior military authorities based upon objections
by junior finance officers whose duty is only to calculate expected
financial outgo and not comment upon the merit of the subject.
One solution that comes to our mind is
instituting a format such as the “Defence Board”. Within that, a judicious mix
of senior military and civil officers could debate proposals and then reach a consensus
which can then be put up for approval of the Minister. The Defence Board is not
an alien concept among democracies. The United Kingdom has a Chief of Defence
Staff for its strategic and operational needs as a single point military
consultant. Additionally, it follows a Board system chaired by the Defence
Minister (Secretary of State for Defence) with members from civil and defence
services and also non-executive board members.
Closer home, the decision-making for the
Railways via the Railway Board is featured in the Rules of Business. The decision-making
process of the Board is headed by the Railways Minister and comprises a healthy
mix of members from different cadres and technical streams under a Chairman
from the Railways.
India has a large strength of defence
services involved not only in operational and strategic matters related to
external defence but also in its internal security and disaster relief and many
other types of aid to civil authorities during peace. Like other democratic
nations, our defence forces have their own ethos, culture, human relations
issues- discipline, human rights, welfare, morale and other functional
requirements. In these days of information technology and rapid socio-political
changes, we cannot have a system where the affected parties or the end-users
are not consulted adequately, or where decisions are taken, based on faulty
inputs by non-experts through one-way file notes. The correct system would
require a face-to-face real time collegiate discussion before decisions are
made.
“Defence of India” involves not just the
military but almost all other institutions of the government; even its
citizenry. However, our Constitution requires the military to work under ‘political
control’ and not ‘bureaucratic control’ under the rules framed decades ago in a
different geo & socio-political milieu.
As in all democratic nations, our military has
an important role to play in building and protecting the nation. Being treated
as a redundant appendage in governance militates against the basic grain of a
democracy and also hampers execution of its modern day role.
It is a fervent hope that the political
environment would rise and find a juste milieu ensuring an
equal voice for all stakeholders with the ultimate decision-making power vested
with the political executive as laid down in our Constitution.
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